Toward an Empirical Concept of Group by Sandelands, Lloyd E. & St. Clair, Lynda
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 3 4  
002  I -8308 
Toward an Empirical Concept of Group 
LLOYD SANDELANDS and LYNDA ST. CLAIR 
What is to be made of the idea of “the group”? Is it a collection of persons- 
literally a gathering together? Or, is it something more-a real presence over 
and above its members? In unguarded moments, when the line is not held either 
way, the concept of the group may even flit between the two - involuntarily, 
and maddeningly, like one of those reversible figures in psychology textbooks 
that won’t let the eye settle on a single image. This duality of the group - it 
seeming to be both a multiple of persons and a single entity - is a basic problem 
of the theory of the group. 
This confusion about groups is deeply ingrained in language. Familiar words 
such as ‘couple’, ‘group’, ‘collective’, ‘organization’, and ‘society’ convey the 
idea, not just of multiplicity, but also of totality. The phrases ‘ a  couple’ or ‘the 
organization’ convey the idea of a single entity. Other languages communicate 
an even more profound sense of the group as a primary fact - so much so that it 
is more difficult in them to convey the idea of a multiplicity. For example, the 
Melanesian and Micronesian languages employ personal pronouns as suffixes 
for the names of social relationships, and particularly of kinship. According to 
Levy-Bruhl ( I  93 I ) ,  the Melanesians: 
. . . do not think in abstract terms, nor reflect upon concepts. They have never had any 
notion of the organic finality manifested by the structure and functions of the living 
body, nor of the special way in which the parts are subordinated to the whole, and the 
whole in turn depends upon its parts. Neither have they ever analyzed the solidarity 
uniting the individuals of the same family with one another. Nevertheless, their 
languages do testify that they do compare these. To them the familial group is a being 
which, by its unity, is like a living body. We too say: the “members” ofa family, but to us 
it is a mere metaphor, though not an inapt one. To them, although they do not think 
about it, it is the literal expression of a fact. (p. 266) 
The confusion about the group is exacerbated by the fact that groups do not 
all appear the same way. Some really do seem to be multiples of persons. 
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Individuals stand out and the group appears as an  arrangement or structuring 
of them. Other groups do  not seem to be constructions of this kind, but rather 
they seem to be integral wholes which submerge individuals within something 
larger. The  difference can be seen, for example, in comparisons across cultures 
(Triandis, 1989). This is from Benedict’s (1934: pp. 97-103) classic analysis of 
the Plains and Pueblo Indians of North America: 
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l h e  Plains Indians in all their institutions gave scope to the self-reliant man who could 
easily assume authority. . . . their institutions fostered personality, almost in the 
Nietzschean sense of the superman. They saw life as the drama of the individual 
progressing upward through grades of men’s societies, through acquisition of super- 
natural power, through feasts and victories. (pp. 97-98) 
The ideal man of the Pueblos is another order ofbeing. [There is an] . . . insistence upon 
the sinking the individual in the group. In Zuni, responsibility and power are always 
distributed and the group is made the functioning unit. The accepted way to approach 
the supernatural is in group ritual. The accepted way to secure family subsistence is by 
household partnership. Neither in religion nor in economics is the individual 
autonomous. . . . Sanction for all acts comes from the formal structure, not from the 
individual. (pp. 98-104)’ 
What is perhaps most interesting about this two-fold experience of groups is 
that it is not taken to be more of a problem. Although the human mind often 
resists dualities, there is something congenial about this duality. Few people 
care that the words for group refer ambiguously to a multiple and to a single 
entity, and except for a n  occasional social scientist, few worry the distinction.’ 
Nor does there seem to be much stumbling over the buried metaphor of “group 
members” (the metaphor seems to glide as easily through Western con- 
sciousness as through that of the Melanesians). Indeed, it seems that talk about 
groups is made easier by the ambiguity. Meanings can be altered as occasion 
demands, and conversation can proceed, even if parties have different ideas in 
mind. We believe that laxness about the duality of groups masks important 
questions about the existence and nature of group entities. 
PLAN OF THE PAPER 
Campbell ( I 958) observed that although a group entity is implied in discussions 
of groups, this entity remains an  empirical and theoretical enigma (see also, 
Moreland, 1987). This paper is an  effort to develop an  empirically grounded 
concept of group entity that can be used for scientific purposes. O u r  aim is to 
move the group entity from the realm of the hypothetical to the realm of the 
real, where it can be an  object of study in its own right. 
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We begin the paper by looking at how the group has been conceptualized. 
We review both classical and contemporary treatments of the group to find that 
it is regarded almost exclusively as a multiple, rather than as an entity. As a 
result, the study of groups is burdened with problems of conceptualization that 
slow its progress. Next we consider Campbell’s (1958) concept of ‘group 
entativity’ as a possible solution to some of these problems. We find, however, 
that instead of substantiating the group as an entity, the entativity concept 
identifies the group as an intellectual construction. 
In the second half of the paper we review arguments and evidence for group 
entities. Although fragmentary, the evidence includes: I ) first-hand reports of 
group entities; 2) indications that group entities have a different psychology 
than group multiples (suggesting functional differences between them) ; and 3) 
similarities across cultures in the conception and symbolization of group 
entities. Taking this material together, we discern five themes which sub- 
stantiate the concept ofgroup entity and distinguish it from the concept of the 
group multiple. Finally, we discuss implications of our analysis for expanding 
the scope of group theory and research. 
THE GROUP AS A MULTIPLE 
As noted by Campbell (1958), claims about groups - e.g., about their 
properties, structure, history, ecology, dynamics, or actions - are premised on 
the idea that groups exist. Nevertheless, the research on groups belies this idea. 
In psychology, there is a tradition of regarding the group as an abstraction - a 
will-o’-the-wisp having no concrete referent except to individual persons (see, 
Golembiewski, 1970). There are few studies of group entities (but see Le Bon, 
1903; McDougall, 1912), and these have been rebuked with charges of 
misplaced concreteness (Allport, I 92 7) and anthropomorphization (see, 
Steiner, 1986). The same is true in sociology, where the mainstream also hews to 
an individual-centered concept of the group (Lee, ~ g g o ) ,  albeit more 
ambivalently (e.g., Homans, 1950; 1987; Turner & Killian, 1987) and 
notwithstanding efforts to conceptualize the groups as a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 
1896/1g32; Mayhew, 1980). We contend that this bias towards the individual 
has limited the development of the theory of groups. Research must be directed 
at understanding groups both as collections of individuals and as entities. 
Definitions of Group 
Table I lists 16 well-known definitions of group. All focus on individuals and 
present the group as a multiple ofindividuals. Only one, by Lewin, speaks of the 
group as an integral whole; but this whole is soon identified with variously 
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Table I Dejinitions of Group 
“any number of persons engaged with one another in a single face-to-face meeting or 
series of such meetings.” -Bales, 1950, p. 33. 
“a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, 
between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together.” - 
Barker et al., 1979, p. 8. 
“acting together, in a coordinated way at  work, leisure, or in social relationships, in the 
pursuit of shared goals, the enjoyment of the joint activity, or simply furthering the 
relationship.” - Argyle, 1991,  p. 15. 
“a collection of individuals whose existence as a collection is rewarding to the 
individuals.” -Bass, 1960, p. 39. 
“an aggregate ofindividuals standing in certain descriptive (i.e., observable) relations to 
each other.” - Brodbeck, 1958, p. 2.  
“a collection of individuals who have relations to one another that make them 
interdependent to some significant degree.” - Cartwright and Zander, 1968, p. 46. 
“a group exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals composing it are pursuing 
promotively interdependent goals.” - Deutsch, 1968, p. 467. 
‘<. . . libidinal ties are what characterize a group.” - Freud, 1922/1959, p. 41. 
“a number of persons who communicate with one another over a span of time, and who 
are few enough so that each person is able to communicate with all the others. . . face to 
face.” - Homans, 1950, p. I .  
“a dynamic whole based on interdependence rather than on similarity.” - Lewin, 
1948, p. 184. 
“a number ofpeople who interact with one another in accord with established patterns. 
. . . one objective criterion [is] . . . frequency of interaction. . . . A second criterion . . . is 
that interacting persons define themselves as ‘members,’ . . . The correlative and third 
criterion is that the persons in interaction are defined by others as ‘belonging to the 
group’” - Merton, 1957, p. 285-286. 
“the distinctive thing about a group is that its members share norms about something.” 
- Newcomb, 195 I ,  p. 38. 
“a number of people who need each other to satisfy basic psychological and biological 
needs.” - Ross, 1989, p. 39. 
“a plural number of separate organisms (agents) who have a collective perception of 
their unity and who have the ability or tendency to act and/or are acting in a unitary 
manner toward the environment.” - Smith, 1945, p. 227 .  
“a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, 
continued 
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Table I continued 
and achieve some degree ofsocial consensus about the evaluation of their groups and of 
their membership in it.” - Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p. 40. 
“a collection or set of individuals who interact with and depend on each other.” - 
Zander, 1982, p. I .  
motivated individuals. Ten definitions mention interaction among individuals 
as a key element and three definitions mention member perceptions of 
‘groupness’ as important. 
The idea that groups are multiples is so established that reviews of the 
literature today hardly need to define the group. For example, in their review of 
the last I o years of small group research, Levine and Moreland ( I  990) offer not 
a single definition of the group. Yet, their focus on individuals is made clear by 
their emphasis upon issues about the composition of groups, conflict in groups, 
the parts individuals play in groups, and the effects of individual leaders on 
group performance. These authors do note a few studies of group responses to 
“exotic” environments, but these are dominated by concerns about individuals. 
Likewise, in the area of group performance, they find that the emphasis has 
been on “social loafing”, an individually-based phenomenon. 
Messick and Mackie (1989) reviewed the previous five years of research on 
intergroup relations. Here we might expect that the group would be its own 
figure. Yet, this possibility is dashed by the authors’ very first sentence: “When 
people are judged, either singly or together, on the basis of group memberships, 
intergroup processes are involved” (p. 45). Groups are said to be perceived 
according to the presence of one or more shared characteristics of members, 
such as race or gender. A defining property of the group therefore is 
homogeneity. But homogeneity is a statement about a multiple ofindividuals- 
about their similarities and differences - not about a group entity. 
The concept in psychology that comes closest to conveying unity is 
‘cohesiveness’. Cohesive groups have a unified purpose, strong norms for 
behavior, a strong sense of identity, high levels of interpersonal liking, and a 
high tolerance for frustration and resistance to dissolution (Newcomb, I 96 I ;  
Cartwright & Zander, 1968). In short, they have more ‘groupness’ than non- 
cohesive groups. However, even though the cohesive group appears unified, 
cohesiveness itself is defined as a quality of group members. Writes Zander 
(1982): 
The cohesiveness of an established group is the strength of members’ desires to remain 
members. Cohesiveness increases as individuals become more attracted to the group and 
develop a greater wish to take part in its programs. (pp. 4-5) 
Thus, in the name of cohesiveness, there is hint of a group entity, but also a 
swerve away from defining the group as such. 
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Sociological writing about groups is more open in its conception of them. 
Turner and Killian ( I 987), for example, find that there is a place in sociological 
theory for both conceptions ofgroup as a multiple and as an entity. “Neither the 
group nor the individual descriptive approach,” they argue, “is inherently 
more error-free than the other. Each type of description completes the other. 
Which will be given priority depends on the purpose at  hand.” (p. 12 )  
However, where the question is put about whether the group is a multiple or an 
entity, it is generally resolved in favor of the former (Taylor & Brown, 1979; 
Tajfel, I 979). Comparing the actions of individuals alone and in groups, Brown 
and Turner (1981, p. 40) write: 
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. . . the distinction we are drawing is not between individuals on the one hand and 
‘something else’ on the other. Both inter-personal and group behaviour are the actions of 
individuals as F. H. Allport correctly pointed out. But in one case the actions are of 
individuals qua individuals, while in the other they are of individuals qua group 
members. 
Granovetter (1978) also comes down on the side of viewing the group as a 
multiple, as have network theorists since (e.g., Freeman, 1992). In  these 
accounts the group is defined as the pattern of interactions of individuals. And 
finally, Alderfer (1987, p. 193) speaks of the need of professional clinicians in 
group therapy to decide between treating the individuals or treating the group 
(see also, Bion, 1959). But his example of an intervention upon the group (e.g., 
“The group might wish to examine why only the male members have been 
talking for the last ten minutes”) focuses on members. 
Finally, some writers give group entities a limited reality, but a t  the same 
time keep focus on individuals. The group is conceived as an appearance of the 
persons that comprise it (e.g., Allport, 1962; Davis, 1992; Schelling, 1978; 
Weick, 1969). The group is said to ‘emerge’ as a macroscopic property of the 
interplay of individuals, somewhat as a melody emerges as a macroscopic 
property of the interplay of variously pitched tones. Although this allows 
conversation about groups to jump between individuals and group entities, it 
has proven not to be a sound basis for theorizing (see, Webster, 1973; Szmatka, 
1989). T o  the contrary, it highlights the problem ofdefining the group entity- 
which on this account has no more substance than that of a property or 
appearance. The idea of emergence sounds definitive, but it is more wishful 
than articulate about group entities. 
Problems 
The main problem with the concept of the group as a multiple is that it fails 
to distinguish between the group and the individuals that comprise it 
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(Golembiewski, 1970). To return to an earlier and well-known example, 
H o r n s  (1950, p. I )  defined the group as “a number of persons who 
communicate with one another over a span of time, and who are few enough so 
that each person is able to communicate with all the others, not at secondhand, 
through other people, but face to face.” Although straightforward and easy to 
operationalize, this definition is silent about what makes a group a group, as 
against a mere aggregate of individuals. The fact that people can and do 
communicate face to face does not give them identity as a group. There are cases 
which satisfy this condition which we might not want to call groups (e.g., people 
who ride the same bus to work every morning), and cases which do not satisfy 
this condition which we might want to call groups (e.g., a line of mountaineers 
scaling a granite face, a family). This criticism applies to all definitions ofgroups 
based on behaviors or attributes of individuals. Each is liable to exceptions for 
the same reason: namely, because such definitions do not define the group apart 
from the individuals that make it up. 
The same problem can be seen in another way as well, in terms of the 
individual group member. If the group is more than a simple aggregate of 
persons, then the persons in it must take on some new quality or attribute in 
virtue ofbeing in the group. However, when membership in the group is defined 
exclusively by behaviors or attributes of persons, then those persons are left as 
they were, unchanged and unilluminated. No new quality is conferred upon 
them for being in the group. Calling them ‘group members’ (to exhume our 
buried metaphor for a moment) does not call to mind anything about a larger 
entity ofwhich they are a unique part, or to which they contribute. Rather, it 
announces only an incidental and superfluous fact about them - namely, that 
they are among others who behave in the same way, or who have the same 
attributes. 
The concept of the group as a multiple is produced by two powerful and 
largely misguided impulses in social theory - one to reduce social entities to 
persons; the other to reify personal attributes or actions as social entities. These 
two impulses are responsible for much of the confusion in group theory today. 
Reduction. Reduction deserves its bad name in social science when it is done 
without knowledge of the object being analyzed. Analytical reduction is a valid 
mode of explanation, but only when both part and whole can be observed. 
Otherwise, it is an empirically empty exercise in definition in which the parts 
define the whole. 
In the absence of a clear view of the entity, reduction creates problems of 
identity (Sandelands & Srivatsan, 1993). There is no telling how parts and 
whole are related. For example, what happens to a group when the persons in it 
leave, or go home at night? And, what happens when they are replaced? Does it 
remain the same group? Further, what happens when replaced persons 
reconvene (as happens with baseball teams on Old Timer’s Days, and is 
beginning to happen with old rock and roll bands)? Which is the real group? 
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Related to this, there is no telling the boundaries of the group. What are the 
criteria for deciding whether a given person is part of the group? What about 
persons who “belong” to multiple groups? (see, Katz & Kahn, 1966; Barnard, 
1938). Can a person be part of a group even ifhe/she never interacts with other 
group  members^'? These droll puzzles signal serious conceptual problems (see, 
e.g., Nozick, 1981), and coping with them requires a clear view of the group as 
an entity. I t  is not enough to know the qualities of parts, for these in no way 
indicate the qualities ofthe whole. As has often been noted (e.g., Mandelbaum, 
1955; Mayhew, I 980; Szmatka, 1989; Webster, 1973), truly social facts - facts 
about group entities - cannot be reduced to facts about individuals. 
The hazards of analytic reduction without a view of the object analyzed can 
perhaps best be seen in contrast to a case where the object is in view. Consider, 
for example, an ordinary pencil. This object could be analyzed as a multiple of 
atoms. However, for purposes of explaining what a pencil is and how it works, 
such an analysis would be absurd because details about atoms are mostly 
irrelevant to these qualities of the pencil. I t  is more pertinent to talk of the pencil 
in terms of its graphite filament, wood or plastic casing, metal band, and soft- 
rubber eraser. Compare this to the unknown group. There is no telling what are 
its relevant parts. To be sure, groups are made of persons (as pencils are made of 
atoms). But this does not mean that persons are its most intelligible or tell-tale 
parts. It might be better to talk of roles, or behaviors, or brain waves, or 
molecules as the parts of groups. As Warriner (in Stoodley, 1962: p. 36) points 
out: 
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. . . the proposition that groups are composed ofpersons tells us nothing about groups as 
such, but merely says that persons are characteristic ofhuman social life. It describes a 
characteristic of groups as one kind of social life, but does not indicate the structural 
components that are involved in groups as a particular kind of unity and real it^.^ 
Reijication. Close cousin to reduction is reification, which can be seen as an ill- 
fated answer to the problems that result when the object under study is 
unknown. Whitehead (1924) described reification as the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. Allport (1962) described it as the fallacy of denoting an object as 
real which cannot be denoted. A group is reified when a multiple of persons is 
mistaken for a group entity. 
A common way that the group is reified is by attributing to a multiple a 
quality or action that applies only to an integral entity-such as when a nation 
is said to declare war, or when a college is said to play a football game, or when 
Congress is said to pass legislation (Allport, 1962). ‘Nation’, ‘college’, and 
‘Congress’ are hypostatized groups that are defined only by the facts that are 
attributed to them. A group is reified also when a multiple is identified 
metaphorically with an object such as a system, organism, or machine (see, e.g., 
Katz and Kahn, 1966; Galbraith, 1977; Parsons, 1951; Thompson, 1967). Such 
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identifications imply that the multiple is an entity just like the object it is 
compared to. When properties of comparison objects are appropriated to an 
unknown group, the result is an unwarranted group entity. 
When the group is reified, so are its actions and effects. This can be seen in 
theories of group processes of adaptation, natural selection, and choice. Such 
theories name processes without specifying their content. They are marked by 
the use of ‘achievement verbs’ (see, Ryle, 1949) such as ‘adapt’, ‘select’, and 
‘choose’, which only point to the facts that they are intended to explain (i.e., 
adapting leads to adaptation, selection to selected groups, and choosing to 
group choices). Achievement verbs can be deceptive because by naming both 
the fact to be explained and the process that does the explaining they offer a 
semantic connection in place of an empirical connection. In theories of groups, 
these verbs become necessary when there is no known group to theorize about 
(Sandelands & Drazin, I 989). 
Reduction and reification are problems because groups have been conceived 
almost exclusively as multiples. As we have tried to show, the research on groups 
has proceeded largely without an orienting view of the group entity (Lee, 1990; 
Steiner, I 986). This is somewhat like studying anatomy and physiology without 
knowing that there is an animal involved - an animal that has a habitat and a 
characteristic way of life. T o  understand the life of groups it is not enough to 
know about people, or even to know about their interactions and networks of 
communication and sentiments. I t  is necessary to know also how these things 
relate to the nature and conduct of the group entity. 
Campbell‘s Concept of Entatiuity 
One way to deal with the problem ofdefining a group is to turn it into a problem 
of perceiving a group. This makes it a problem that ostensibly can be studied in 
its own right. Campbell (1958) argued that the question of whether or not 
group entities exist should be abandoned in favor ofthe question ofhow they are 
perceived. According to Campbell, it is more useful to regard entity-ness as an 
attribute or aspect that aggregates of individuals are perceived to have in 
greater or lesser degree, rather than as a fact about some groups and not others. 
Writes Campbell: 
Among actual or potential aggregates of persons, there are certain aggregates which 
meet criteria of being “entities,” and other aggregates which do not. This distinction is 
capable of empirical representation. (p. 15) 
According to Campbell, what makes the social aggregate an entity is the same 
thing that makes any other collection of elements an entity - namely, the fact 
that we perceive them as such.4 He argues that perception is a logical process of 
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inferring objects from relationships among parts. What distinguishes social 
entities from ordinary objects (what he calls “middle-sized’’ objects), such as a 
stone or laboratory rat, is only the obviousness and immediateness of the 
inferences. In the latter instances, the process is so automatic that we do not 
notice the cues and logic steps that go into making them. However, in the case of 
social entities, the cues and logic steps are “less solid, less multiply confirmed, of 
less sharp boundaries, and less hard” (p. 1 7 ) .  Based on the early work of 
Wertheimer, Kohler, and other Gestalt psychologists on object perception in 
the visual system, Campbell offers four principles of group perception: I )  
proximity (people close together are more likely to be perceived as parts of a 
group; 2) similarity (people who are similar are more likely to be perceived as 
parts of the same group); 3) common fate (people that move together in the same 
direction, and otherwise in successive temporal observations, are more likely to 
be perceived as parts of the same group); and 4) pregnance (people forming a part 
of spatial organization or pattern tend to be perceived as part of the same 
group). Thus, according to Campbell, the difference between group multiples 
and group entities is quantitative rather than qualitative-one ofdegree rather 
than kind. 
Variants of Campbell’s reasoning can be seen today in studies of group 
categorization and social identity. These studies ask how individuals perceive 
groups and how they think about themselves and others in relation to groups 
(e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990; Insko & Schopler, 1987; Knowles & Bassett, 1976; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Wegner & Giuliano, 1982; Wilder, 1977). Knowles & Bassett 
(1976), for example, found that subjects approaching a gathering of people at 
the entrance ofa building were more likely to treat that gathering as a unit (by 
walking around it rather than through it to get into the building) when the 
gathered persons were physically similar to one another and when there was a 
large number of them. And Tajfel & Turner ( I 979) reviewed several studies 
which showed that the simple fact of social categorization, even when based 
upon ad hoc and trivial characteristics of individuals (e.g., preference for Klee 
versus Kandinski paintings), was enough to trigger discrimination between 
groups (e.g., as reflected in biased allocation of rewards). Following Campbell, 
the premise guiding these studies is that group entities exist as unitized 
collections of individuals, where unit-formation is an inference process in 
cognition or perception. 
There are two main drawbacks of Campbell’s concept of entativity that 
undermine it as a basis for the study ofgroups. First, the entativity concept rests 
upon an untenable model of perception, in which objects are inferred from 
relationships among their parts (i.e., proximity, similarity, common fate, and 
pregnance). Perception cannot operate this way, as Figure I demonstrates 
[from Palmer, 19751. 
If asked what is pictured in Figure I a we would probably say that it is a face. 
If asked how we know that it is a face, we might answer - following Campbell 
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- that we inferred this from the constant proximity ofelements that are alike in 
being parts of a face (i.e., two eyes, a nose, a mouth, and a head). But compare 
this to Figure I b. Here, we would be hard-pressed to say that this is likewise a 
face, despite the fact that it is equally a constant conjunction offace parts (i.e., 
two eyes, a nose, a mouth, and a head). What makes one set of parts a face and 
the other a meaningless collection? Notice that it is no use to say that Figure ~b is 
not an aggregate of face parts (but an aggregate ofgeometric figures let’s say), 
for this would mean that the parts of a face cannot be identified independently 
of their participation in the face as a whole. And this would mean that the face 
could not have been inferred from its parts. Thus, whereas it may seem that the 
whole is known from its parts, this cannot be the case. Indeed, the parts 
themselves cannot be known except with reference to the whole. 
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The concept of entativity supposes that the group can be known from its 
parts; which in this case are persons. But as just demonstrated, this begs the 
question of how persons are known to be parts of the group - if not by prior 
knowledge of the group. This is a mistake of confusing a principle of analysis 
(i.e., that a group entity can be analyzed as a whole made of parts) with a 
principle of fact (i.e., that the group entity is a whole made of parts). The first 
principle is true, the second is not. 
The second drawback to the entativity concept is that it is inherently 
unscientific. T o  be susceptible of scientific study, an object must have, or be 
presumed to have, an objective basis that is independent of the knower. The 
concept of entativity, however, denies such an objective basis by identifying the 
fact of the group entity with the fact of its perception - and with a narrowly 
conscious and verbalizable perception at  that. The question of whether or not 
group entities exist is turned into the question of whether or not they are 
consciously perceived. Perhaps the latter question seems more open to study, 
more answerable, and less suspect philosophically (since it assumes nothing 
about reality). But i t  is a different question. And in respect to the study of 
groups, it is an unscientific question because it removes groups from the outer 
world of objects and confines them to an inner world of intellectual inference. 
In  these two ways, work in the area of social perception since Campbell 
( I 958) steps aside of the questions offact that we wish to address - namely, ‘Do 
group entities exist in the world?’ and, if so, ‘Can they be investigated 
scientifically?’. Ours is a separate and historically older question of social 
psychology that is not identical to the question of how group entities could be 
inferred from perceptions of individuals. 
THE GROUP AS AN ENTITY 
This section presents arguments in support of group entities. I t  begins by 
reviewing three kinds of evidence for these entities. The first consists of first- 
hand reports ofgroup entities. These reports are not equated with group entities 
(as ifgroup entities needed only to be perceived to exist), but instead are taken 
to indicate group entities in fact. The second kind ofevidence consists offindings 
that suggest that group multiples and group entities have different social 
dynamics and psychologies. They suggest that the difference between group 
multiples and group entities is qualitative, and not quantitative as Campbell 
suggests. The third kind ofevidence consists ofsuggestions of a cultural basis for 
group entities, which appears as a tendency to symbolize group entities. Such 
symbols may make group entities salient to members and may make them easier 
to think about. Based upon these three kinds of evidence, we identify several 
common themes which together lead toward an empirical concept of group 
entities. 
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Evidence of Group Entities 
I ) First-Hand Accounts 
People have intimations of group entities that they sometimes try to 
verbalize. Below we consider examples from members of a motorcycle gang, a 
well-known essayist, sports broadcasters, a basketball coach, social scientists, 
and biologists. Far from being a systematic survey, these disparate examples are 
offered only to suggest that experiences ofgroup entities are widespread, even if 
conscious awareness of those experiences may be somewhat rare. Other 
examples, no doubt, could be added to the list. 
Bosozoku Motorcycle Gangs. A primary activity of young Japanese motorcycle 
gangs, called Bosozoku, is participation in ‘bosozoku’ runs. A run consists of a 
large number of members racing as a group through the city. Sata (1988) has 
collected descriptions of this activity from many of its participants. These 
descriptions often portray the group, not as a collective, but as a transcendent 
entity. As one member describes it: 
‘Seventy to one hundred vehicles start their engines all at once. We can hear nothing but 
the exhaust noises. Nobody can, even the police cannot, stop us. . . . The moment the 
engines are started the disorderly crowd becomes a dinosaur. It’s really overwhelming.’ 
(P. 101)  
Another member put it this way: 
‘When running, we are not in complete harmony at the start. But if the run begins going 
well, all of us, all of us feel for others. How can I say this? When, when we wag the tail of 
the band. . . When our minds become, become one. At such a time, it’s a real pleasure 
. . . When all of us become one, I understand something . . . All of a sudden, I realize, 
“oh! we’re one” and think, “If we speed as fast as we can, it will become a real RUN.” 
. . . When we realize that we become one flesh, it’s supreme.’ (p. I I 3) 
Montaigne on Friendship. I n  his well-known essay on friendship, Michel de  
Montaigne ( 1588/ 1949) emphasizes the unity and indissoluble character of his 
friendship with Ettiene de  la Boetie. Far from a casual acquaintance, this 
friendship melded two souls into a single indivisible entity. 
For the rest, what we commonly call friends and friendships are nothing but 
acquaintances and familiarities, contracted either by some accident or by convenience, 
by means of which our souls are held together. In the friendship I speak of, they mingle 
and merge together with so complete a blending that they efface and can no longer find 
the seam that joined them. (p. 65) 
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The unity marked off by their friendship is further indicated by its conspicuous 
absence of individual will or concern: 
This [friendship] has no other model than itself and can be compared only with itself. It 
is no one particular consideration, nor two, nor three, nor four, nor a thousand. It is I 
know not what quintessence of all this mixture which, having seized my whole will, led it 
to plunge and lose itself in his; which having seized his whole will, led it, with equal 
hunger and emulation, to plunge and lose itself in mine. I may truly say lose since we 
reserved for ourselves nothing that was our own, nor that was either his or mine. (p. 66) 
The “Amoeba Defense”. When discussing the play of the University of Nevada 
men’s basketball team during the 1990 NCAA Championship Game, the 
television announcers referred repeatedly to its “amoeba defense” - a defense 
so named for its fluidity and tenacious envelopment of opposing players (who 
must have felt they were swallowed-up by something superhuman). This 
metaphor bespeaks a unity that is sometimes observed in athletic contests when 
a team operates with singular purpose and efficiency. 
At times like these, coaches and players alike distinguish the group entity 
from the multiple of players that belong to it. The team is something over and 
above a collection of individuals, and this is reflected particularly in the quality 
of its play. I n  the former case, but not the latter, there is a sense of the players 
being “in a groove” and almost preternaturally “in tune” with their fellow 
teammates. Often this sense or feeling is accompanied by a level of peak 
performance where play unfolds instinctively based on  subtle interactions and 
anticipations that are acted on even before registering in awareness. There is 
beauty in this as well, as suggested in these observations of one of the games 
premier coaches, Jack Ramsey (in Halberstam, 1981, p. 124): 
What is this game that runs through my mind? It is a ballet, a graceful sweep and flow of 
patterned movement, counterpointed by daring and imaginative flights of solitary 
brilliance. It is a dance which begins with opposition contesting every move. But in the 
exhilaration of a great performance, the opposition vanishes. The dancer does as he 
pleases. The game is unified action up and down the floor. It is quickness, it is strength; it 
is skill, it is stamina, it is five men playing as one. 
Moments o f  Communitas. Glimpses of group entities are sometimes reported in 
ceremony or ritual, or on other occasions of strong emotion or profundity. 
Turner ( 1974) describes the feeling of “spontaneous communitas”, which is 
experienced as a source of power and as a sense of the group as a n  entity. H e  
writes: 
Is there any of us who has not known this moment when compatible people - friends, 
congeners - obtain a flash oflucid mental understanding on the existential level, when 
they feel that all problems (not just their problems), whether emotional or cognitive, 
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could be resolved, if only the group which is felt (in the first person) as ‘essentially us’ 
could sustain its inter-subjective illumination [p. 791. 
Writing along similar lines, Durkheim ( I  915) has remarked of a “collective 
life” which emerges sui generis in the heightened emotions which occur 
sometimes in religious gatherings. This phenomena of the group he called 
“collective effervescence”: 
Vital energies are over-excited, passions are more active, sensations stronger; there are 
even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; 
he feels himself transformed and consequently, he transforms the environment which 
surrounds him [p. 4221. 
Group Entities in Biology. Although somewhat rare in social science, the idea of 
group entities is familiar in biology. The eminent entomologist, Wheeler, began 
talking about social insect colonies as organisms in the early 1900’s. In his view, 
such colonies (e.g., ants, termites, honey bees) are “real organisms and not 
merely conceptual constructions or analogies” (Wheeler, I 939, pp. 6-7). He 
based his argument on the many parallels between these colonies and 
organisms. Both maintain a unitary form through time and space, resist 
dissolution, and can be distinguished from others in their environment. Both are 
singular soma made up of individuated elements of germ plasm (cells in the 
organism, ants in the colony). And finally, both are functional unities having 
regulatory and restitutive mechanisms. In the ant colony, for example, if the 
queen dies, a worker develops ovaries and takes over the queen’s place as the 
egg-layer for the colony. Thus, the same colony continues although the 
individual queen has been replaced. This is functionally analogous to the 
regeneration of cells in organisms. 
According to Thomas (1g74), Wheeler’s view of insect colonies as organisms 
was popular from 191 I until the early I ~ ~ o ’ s ,  but it fell from favor because 
“nobody could figure out what to do with such an abstraction” (p. 149). I t  
lacked the heuristic value required for its own survival. Today, however, the 
concept is back in fashion, and indeed is recognized as necessary for accounting 
for the behavior of social insects such as ants. As Holldobler & Wilson (1990) 
note in their definitive work on ants, “The study of ant social organization is by 
necessity both a reductionistic and a holistic enterprise” (p. 3). Add to this the 
increasing difficulty that biologists have had in making hard and fast 
distinctions between concepts of organism and colony (entity and multiple). 
Even the cell, the paradigm example of an organism, is suspect. Margulis 
( I 98 I ) has shown how the eukaryotic (nucleated) cell, the basic cell type for all 
plant and animal life on earth, must have evolved from communities of 
prokaryotic cells. The simple, unicellular amoeba turns out to be a complex 
community of microbes that work together for mutual benefit and survival. The 
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picture emerging in biology thus is one in which concepts of both entity and 
multiple apply to all units of life. 
Running through the foregoing accounts of group entities is the message that 
these groups differ from group multiples (i.e., a qualitative rather than 
quantitative difference). These groups are seen as distinct from the aggregate, as 
entities that are not multiples ofpersons. Such a description is possible only ifthe 
group is recognized in its own right; apart from the group multiple. And 
whereas the concept of entativity could account for a perception of a group 
entity, as Campbell describes, it cannot account for a perception of a group 
entity that is not a group multiple. The latter is a more sophisticated perception 
that cannot be explained by the laws of perceptual organization described by 
Campbell. 
Finally, although the foregoing first-hand accounts may leave the impression 
that the concept of group entity is limited to extreme phenomena or to 
exceptional moments, we believe that the concept has general applicability, 
and that it is the conscious awareness of these phenomena that is limited to 
extreme phenomena and exceptional moments. Ordinarily the feelings which 
intimate the presence ofgroup entities are insufficiently conscious or too fleeting 
to be reflected upon and captured in the pale of discursive self-report. What is 
remarkable about the accounts above, in our view, is not the existence ofgroup 
entities, but the fact that sensitive observers identified them as a salient fact in 
the situation. In any event, the generality of group entities remains an 
unresolved empirical question. 
Lloyd Sandelands and Lynda St. Clair 
2 )  Two Psychologies o f  Groups 
While the reports above suggest that group entities are experienced as 
qualititatively distinct from group multiples, they do not establish the crucial 
theoretical claim that it is important to distinguish the two. As William James 
somewhere said, a difference that makes no difference is no difference. 
The claim that group entities differ significantly from group multiples is 
suggested by evidence that the two types of groups have different psychologies 
and dynamics. Such differences can be seen in Milgram’s (1974) research on 
modes of obedience, Janis’ ( I  972) investigations of failures of group decision- 
making, Le Bon’s ( I 903) studies of psychological crowds, and Blamer’s ( I 964) 
analysis ofalienation in business organizations, to name a few examples that are 
perhaps well known. A brief review of the work of these authors adds further 
plausibility to the claim that group entities and group multiples differ in 
substance as well as in appearance. 
Milgram and the Psychology of Obedience. Among the best-known findings of 
social psychology is that obedience takes two discrete forms - one that involves 
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a mental state ofautonomy, in which people act responsibly as individuals; and 
another that involves a mental state ofagency, in which people act irresponsibly 
as agents of a leader or authority (Milgram, 1974). Milgram’s experiments, it 
may be recalled, engaged subjects in what was ostensibly a study of the effects of 
punishment on learning. Subjects were asked to evaluate the learning 
performance of another person (actually a confederate of the experimenter) 
and to administer electrical shocks to that person when he/she made an error. 
The shocks were designed to appear, by degrees, more painful and more 
dangerous with each error. Setting aside a number of interesting details, 
Milgram’s basic finding was that subjects, who at first may have acted on their 
own behalf, grew increasingly anxious and restive as the shocks became more 
severe. But only to a point. Beyond this point, subjects who remained in the 
experiment (i.e., who obeyed the experimenter’s requests to continue) seemed 
to reconcile themselves to the task and to overcome whatever conflict they had 
felt about it. From this point onward, they acted (often strangely and 
mechanically) as the unresponsible agent of the experimenter. Milgram’s most 
arresting finding may have been that not a single subject who came within 5 
shocks of the end of the experiment failed to complete the experiment (despite 
the seemingly horrific consequences of the shocks to the person receiving them) 
Milgram concluded from his experiments that there occurred a definite 
transition in the dynamics ofthe social interaction, which he likened to a change 
of phase. Says Milgram: “I think of a state of agency as a real transformation; 
. . . just as water can turn to ice under certain conditions of temperature, a 
person can move to the state I call agency” [in Meyer, 1970, p. 1321. This 
transformation, according to Milgram, is not merely a quantitative change, 
rather it is a qualitative change that participants recognize and often try to 
resist. Again, in Milgram’s words: “They even try to get out ofit but they are. . . 
engaged in something from which they cannot liberate themselves. They are 
locked into a structure, and they do not have the skills or inner resources to 
disengage themselves” [in Meyer, 1970, p. 1301. This idea that obedience is a 
distinct condition of the dyad having its own form and dynamics is compatible 
with the idea of a group entity. Further, the change of phase in moving from 
autonomous actor to obedient agent could mark a change from a group 
multiple to a group entity. 
(Milgram, ‘974, P. 35). 
Janis and Groupthink. A similar interpretation can be given to Janis’ (1972) 
observations of the phenomenon of group decision-making that he called 
‘groupthink’. According to Janis, groupthink is a particular and pathological 
condition of group decision-making that arises in a cohesive in-group when 
concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant that it overrides realistic appraisal of 
alternative courses of action. I t  is an inversion of the usual effect ofcohesiveness 
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upon group dynamics. Whereas people ordinarily are more willing and able to 
share their views as they become more comfortable and friendly with one 
another, under conditions of groupthink, they are less willing and able to share 
their views. Instead, they strive to protect one another from dissenting views. 
Janis ( I 972) argues that groupthink comprises a definite break and alteration 
in the psychology of the group. Defining this break, he argues, is a non- 
deliberate suppression of critical thought which manifests itself as a syndrome of 
illusions of group unanimity and invulnerability, and a belief in the inherent 
morality of the group. For some reason, and without intending to d o  so, group 
members stop thinking for themselves, and put their faith in the wisdom of the 
group instead. As in the example of obedience above, the concept of a 
groupthink group having unique psychological dynamics rests easily alongside 
the concept of a group entity that is qualitatively distinct from group multiples. 
Further, and again as in the example of obedience, the change in social 
psychology observed in moving from a non-groupthink group to a groupthink 
group may correspond to a change in the group from a multiple to a n  entity. 
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Le Bon and the Mental Unity of  Crowds. One  of the foremost observers of large 
groups was Le Bon ( I 903). His reflections on the nature and activities of crowds 
led him to suggest that crowds sometimes develop a psychology that is distinct 
from the psychology of individuals. I n  his preface to The Crowd (1903) he 
previews his most important insight: 
The whole of the common characteristics with which heredity endows the individuals of 
a race constitute the genius of the race. When, however, a certain number of these 
individuals are gathered together in a crowd for purposes of action, observation proves 
that, from the mere fact of their being assembled, there result certain new psychological 
characteristics that differ from them at times to a very considerable degree. 
Le Bon’s argument for the identity of the crowd thus is based on its possession 
of unique characteristics that are not represented by individuals and cannot be 
inferred from individual characteristics. This is clear in his description of how 
crowds form: 
Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an 
agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the 
individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering 
take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective 
mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. 
The gathering has thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an 
organized crowd, or, ifthe term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms 
a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of crowds. (pp. 1-2) 
What really takes place is a combination followed by the creation of new characteristics, 
just as in chemistry certain elements, when brought into contact - bases and acids, for 
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example - combine to form a new body possessing properties quite different from those 
of the bodies that have served to form it. (p. 6 )  
And finally, much like the biologists and their ant colonies, Le Bon compared 
the crowd to an organism. I t  is a comparison that he intended as an expression 
of literal fact, and not of mere simile: 
The psychological crowd is a provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements, which 
for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by 
their reunion a new being which displays characteristics very different from those 
possessed by each of the cells singly. (p. 6) 
Blauner and the Alienated Worker. Completing our skein of observations about 
the two psychologies of groups - a cloth which runs from Milgram’s dyads to 
Janis’ small groups to Le Bon’s crowd - we come finally to observations of 
alienation in industrial society. As described by Blauner (1964), alienation is a 
definite psychological condition or syndrome that arises from certain social and 
technical arrangements in the work place and that is characterized mainly by 
feelings of powerlessness, meaningless, isolation, and self-estrangement. This 
psychological condition, especially when compared to the psychological 
condition of craftwork, likewise suggests that there are two distinct psychologies 
of groups. 
According to Blauner ( I 964), alienation is produced by work place 
arrangements that divide or fragment the individual from the social entity. 
Alienation results when a person’s existence and consciousness are split into 
subject and object, when a person is sundered from the group and related to it as 
part to whole, when a person feels that he/she is in society rather than ofsociety, 
and when a person’s activity becomes a means to an end, rather than an end in 
itself. The paradigm example, well-known, is the automated assembly line. The 
typical factory worker is related to the work in essentially the same way as a 
machine (often by a design which treats the worker as one more factor of 
production, and necessary only and until his/her activities can be performed 
more efficiently in some other way). What results are movements and 
contributions that are specialized and stereotyped to limit their idiosyncrasy 
and thereby their subjectivity. At the same time, the worker is oriented 
primarily toward machines, and so is isolated from others who take positions 
elsewhere on the assembly line. This experience of the individual as alienated 
from the group entity may be contrasted with many kinds of craftwork where 
there is greater personal involvement in the work and more natural relations 
among coworkers. In  these latter cases, where the individual is identified with 
the social entity, there arises a radically opposed psychology of self-actual- 
ization, belongingness, and meaningfulness. 
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3) Symbolization of Group Entities 
Finally, an indirect affidavit ofgroup entities is the apparently universal need 
to symbolize them. In traditional societies, the clan was symbolized by its totem. 
In modern societies, the family is symbolized by the family name, sports teams 
by a name and sometimes a mascot, and business organizations by a name, logo, 
and even an advertising slogan. And, whether traditional or modern, almost all 
such groups celebrate themselves in myth or story. The pervasiveness of such 
symbols could not be coincidental, but must reflect a deep-seated urge (even a 
compulsion) to represent the group as an entity that is distinct from its 
individual members and that is distinct from other groups5 
Through symbolization, feelings of the group are given imaginable form - 
typically that ofan object or event that can be perceived, such as a totem, name, 
mascot, logo, story, or even a charismatic leader. The symbol offers an objective 
basis for conceiving feelings of the group. The symbol represents the group in a 
definite form that makes it more obviously real and thereby more discussable. 
The symbol thus differs from a sign, which does not embody its object in this 
way, but rather signals its presence by being paired with it. As Langer ( I 95 I ,  
pp. 26-52) points out, the symbol is what the mind uses to think with; it is the 
basic stuff of thought. 
This view of symbolization is supported by the researches and writings of 
others who have investigated the relationship between the group and its 
symbols. According to Durkheim (1915), the totem of primitive societies 
functions as a rallying center for the clan and gives the clan a religious 
dimension. By expressing the experienced unity ofthe clan in material form, the 
totem makes that unity a present fact for members ofthe clan. Often, the totem 
is emblematic of one or more felt aspects of the clan (e.g., as a totemic animal 
might embody a clan’s aggressive inclinations, or powers of survival; or as a 
totemic vegetable might embody a clan’s spiritual identification with the land). 
By identifying the group with an integral and often living object or event, the 
totem affirms the integrity and vitality of the group, and provides a basis for 
group feelings and for thinking about the group in relation to other objects and 
events. 
Writing about the psychology of the group, Freud ( I 922/ I 959) theorized 
that its leader is the primary emotional object and symbol of the group. 
According to Freud, the primary mechanism of group formation is an 
instinctive emotional identification and bonding (libidinal cathexis) of group 
members to group leaders. An allied mechanism of group formation occurs as 
group members identify with one another as a result of their common libidinal 
cathexis to the leader. Through these mechanisms the leader-object is 
assimilated to the ego ideal and the leader is established as the emblem of the 
group. 
And finally, Morocco (1979) has written similarly, though not directly in 
Freudian terms, about the emotional needs that are exercised and satisfied by 
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stories about the group, and about the role of stories in symbolizing the group 
entity: 
. . . group story telling can be understood [in part] as a process by which individual 
member’s feeling about the group becomes transformed into collective conceptions of 
the group. The process begins with ( I )  members experiencing an uncertain, formless 
feeling; and continues with (2)  the introduction ofa private image by one member which 
expresses his/her feeling; (3) the diffusion and elaboration of that image by other 
members; and (4) the representation of member’s shared view of the group in dramatic 
form, such as a story, joke, or game (p, I 8) .  
These ideas are consistent with the suggestion above that group symbols are 
universal because they address a basic cultural problem. Namely, that of giving 
objective form to a wordless awareness of the group entity. 
Common Themes 
Although none of the foregoing anecdotes or arguments is by itself a convincing 
demonstration of a group entity, we believe that when taken together they 
suggest themes that point to a viable empirical concept of the group entity. We 
discuss five such themes below. 
I ) Supervening Qualities. The first-hand accounts of group entities, together 
with the evidence of their unique social psychology, call attention to 
supervening qualities of group entities that cannot be reduced to or described as 
qualities of its participants. The most definitive of these qualities is unity. This 
quality is suggested when a Bosozoku member refers to her gang as “one flesh”, 
when Montaigne speaks of his friend and himself as a “complete blending” 
wherein it is not possible to “find the seam that joined them”, when Le Bon 
identifies the psychological crowd as a “single being” subject to the “law of 
mental unity”, when Wheeler remarks of the ant-colony as an organism, and 
when Blauner alludes to humane society as that in which the individual is not 
distinguished from the group as part to whole. 
In  many instances the unity of the group appears in connection with some 
other supervening quality. For Le Bon, the collective mentality of the group 
supervenes over that of its individual members (which, by comparison, is 
typically more subtle and responsible). Likewise, the fluid enveloping quality of 
the “Amoeba Defense” distinguishes the basketball team from its contributing 
members. Other authors say the same about the qualities of cohesion, mind, 
structure, rationality, group beliefs, locomotion, atavism, cruelty, stupidity, 
and even the sound of buzzing (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990; Kroeber, 1917; Mayhew, 
1980; Warriner, 1956; McDougall, I 91 2 ;  Sandelands and Stablein, I 987). For 
many authors (but not all - see, e.g., Allport, 1962), such qualities indicate the 
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presence of a definite something beyond the individual - although they do not 
indicate precisely what that something is. 
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2) Changed Persons. Just as the group entity has qualities that distinguish it 
from a multiple of persons, the persons who constitute the group entity have 
qualities that distinguish them from the persons that constitute a group 
multiple. Milgram describes the unselfconscious and eerily robotic obedience of 
persons who act as agents of another person or a group. Janis traces a syndrome 
of illusions and uncritical thought that plague group members under conditions 
of groupthink. And, writing of the faces in the crowd, Le Bon and Freud note 
the disappearance of the conscious personality (with its inhibitions, restraint, 
and civility), and its replacement by the unconscious personality (with its 
impulsiveness, atavism, sense of omnipotence, irresponsibility, changeableness, 
credulity, and enthrallment to a leader). 
3)  Lqe-like Dynamisms. Group entities are dynamic, and remarkably life-like. 
One might almost say they are alive. According to oneBosozoku member, “The 
moment the engines are started, the disorderly crowd becomes a dinosaur” (emphasis 
added). Another speaks of “wagging the tail of the band” and of becoming “one 
flesh”. In the realm of basketball, a defense is named for its semblance to an 
amoeba, and a game in its best moments is said to be a kind ofdance. Durkheim 
describes religious ritual as a collective effervescence rooted in vital energies and 
active passions and sensations. And where the group entity is absent, as in 
Blauner’s description of the alienated group, there is a loss oflife, a spiritual and 
emotional deadening. And, not least, the biologists Wheeler and Thomas, and 
the anthropologist Le Bon, talk earnestly of ants, termites, and human crowds 
as organisms. Talk about group entities is full of images of life. 
4)  Directness. The first-hand accounts above suggest that the group entity 
enters awareness directly - that it is comprehended all at once, in its entirety, 
and without reflection. It seems the group entity is really there, not as a figment 
of the imagination, nor yet as an inference about persons. In this respect, the 
group entity is like any other object of immediate awareness, such as a book or 
beer can or shoe. I t  is ‘just known’ and the knower cannot say how or why. This 
givenness of the group is reflected by the symbols that are used for it, which are 
as present as books, beer cans, or shoes (e.g. totems, names, leaders, stories). As 
Montaigne points out, to analyze an entity such as his friendship with Le Boetie 
as an amalgam ofindividuals is to misrepresent that entity and to mislead about 
how it is known. 
In contrast to the direct awareness of group entities, perceptions of group 
multiples are indirect and require conscious effort to construct and justify. To 
see a group multiple requires an act of discernment that goes beyond simple 
seeing, and that combines perception and conception. First, a number of 
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individuals must be observed. Then, those individuals must be classified 
together based upon one or more shared characteristics. Thus, to perceive a 
number ofworkers as a multiple might involve seeing that they are engaged in 
the same task, or that they are wearing the same uniform. O r  to see a number of 
school children as a clique might involve knowing what tastes they share in 
common, or who talks to or has regard for whom. Far from being direct, 
unmediated, and unconscious, perceptions of group multiples are more 
complicated and contingent. 
5) Knowledge Based in Feeling. Finally, whereas most things are known with 
little or no apparent feeling or involvement - save perhaps for the dim feeling 
of being conscious - it is different with group entities. The reports of 
Montaigne, Bosozoku members, Ramsey, Turner, and Durkheim are suffused 
with feeling, and betray an active, ifnot intense, involvement with the group in 
question. Likewise, the theories of the social psychology of group entities by 
Milgram, Janis, Le Bon and Blauner, suggest a prominent role for feeling-and 
in particular that the experience of a group entity feels different than the 
experience of a group multiple. Feeling may be the way group entities are 
known. 
The examples of friendship and communitas especially, suggest that group 
entities are felt rather than simply seen. Although vision undoubtedly is 
involved, it is as part of the complex matrix of immediate bodily reactions in 
which feeling arises. Group entities are first known as feelings. Later, and upon 
a second look, they may be “reconstructed” as multiples of persons based on 
shared attributes of those persons. This view is reinforced by the difficulties 
observers have in describing them. Even the acute sensibilities and eloquent pen 
ofMontaigne could not put in words the nature and basis ofhis sure and abiding 
friendship - which was for him a feeling beyond words. Asch (1952) refers to 
the feeling of the group as one of “atmosphere” and notes that it is both vivid 
and difficult to define (p. 225). As suggested earlier, from these difficulties arises 
the need to symbolize the group by objects or stories which can be visualized 
and turned over in the mind. 
What does it mean to say that the group entity is felt? And what is the nature 
of this feeling? As Langer ( I  967) has pointed out, feeling is a phase principle. I t  
is the way activity appears in consciousness when it has surpassed a threshold 
level of intensity. In Buck’s (1985) terminology, it is a ‘read out’ of ongoing 
behavior. This conception ofhow group entities are known is consistent with the 
suggestion above that group entities are life-like dynamisms rather than simple 
objects. Being dynamic, they must be known by a process that can represent the 
essential features of a dynamism. And being lifelike, this process must be one of 
feeling (see, Langer, I 967). This is the process that McDougall ( I 924) described 
as ‘the principle of direct induction of emotion by way of the primitive 
sympathetic response’ (p. 24). As sensitive creatures, who are more or less 
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attuned to what is going on around them, people can register and feel the 
dynamisms of the group in themselves.6 
This view of how group entities are known is reminiscent of Levy-Bruhl’s 
( I 926/ 1985) conception of the mentality of “primitive” peoples. The primitive 
mind, wrote Levy-Bruhl, does not experience the world atomistically in terms of 
distinct and logically classifiable ‘things’. Rather, it experiences the world as an 
interplay of objects or events that embody or convey supernatural powers. 
These “mystical” objects and events are known, not by immediately given 
qualities or attributes, but by their felt participation in the dynamic matrix of 
everyday life. Whereas the percepts of the civilized mind are ordered logically 
and obey the ‘law of non-contradiction’, those of the primitive mind obey a 
different ‘law of participation’ which recognizes their active role in daily 
experience. 
Interestingly, what was for Levy-Bruhl a development of culture,’ was for 
Freud a development of the ego. According to Freud ( I 9301 I 96 I ) , awareness of 
the ego (self) and of others develops from a single undifferentiated experience: 
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. . . originally, the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from 
itself. Our  present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more 
inclusive - indeed, an all-embracing - feeling which corresponded to a more intimate 
bond between the ego and the world about it. If we may assume that there are many 
people in whose mental life this primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or less 
degree, it would exist in them side by side with the narrower and more sharply 
demarcated ego-feeling of maturity, like a kind of counterpart to it. (p. I 5 )  
Thus, in Freud’s thinking, the capacity to feel a group develops before the 
capacity to single out concepts ofself (ego) and other. That the capacity to feel a 
group should come first is clear in the case of the developing infant who’s 
survival depends upon union with others. According to Freud, this capacity is 
maintained in the mature ego alongside that of seeing group as multiples, and 
likewise for reasons that the adult depends on the group.8 
In view of the examples given earlier, it is perhaps not surprising that Freud 
nominated the condition of ‘love’ as a paradigmatic and non-pathological 
example of the capacity to feel a group: 
Normally, there is nothing ofwhich we are more certain than the feeling ofour self, ofour 
own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off 
distinctly from everything else. . . . There is only one state - admittedly an unusual 
state, but not one that can be stigmatized as pathological - in which it does not do this. 
At the height of being in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt 
away. Against all the evidences of his senses, a man who is in love declares that ‘I’ and 
‘you’ are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact. (pp. I 2-1 3) 
Finally, because group entities are known as feelings, one hesitates to classify 
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them with other kinds of entities that are known as perceptions or intellectual 
judgments. Group entities do not have the same matter-of-factness as visually 
perceived entities. They can be recognized but not pointed to. And whereas 
knowledge of visually perceived things lends itself to verbal expression, 
knowledge of group entities seems locked in a bodily awareness that is beyond 
language. This invites the conclusion that group entities are less “real”. But this 
conclusion confuses an epistemic point with an ontological point. That the 
group entity is known by feeling does not make it less of a fact; rather, it 
identifies it as the same kind of fact as a feeling. Group entities have the same 
logical form (dynamic, lifelike) as feelings; which is why they are known by 
feeling rather than by visual perception. 
The Concept of Group Entity 
Several ideas about group entities have been adduced. Group entities are: a)  
marked by qualities that supervene over individuals; b) comprised of persons 
who take on definite qualities; c) dynamic and life-like; d) known without 
reflection; and e) felt rather than seen. But what, at long last, do these ideas 
portend for a concept of the group entity? 
One way to conceive of the group entity that is consistent with these ideas 
(and that in retrospect seems to be demanded by them) is as a form of life. This 
abstraction conveys simply and precisely its essential properties - its life- 
likeness, its unique organic qualities, and its subordination of its participants to 
a dynamism. This abstraction also makes sense of the fact that the group entity 
is known directly (the human organism being naturally attuned to perceiving 
forms of life) and primarily on the basis of feeling (perhaps induced 
sympathetically, as described by McDougall) . 
In important respects, this concept of group entity recalls the concepts of 
group offered by Follett (1937) and Giddens ( I 979). For these writers, the unity 
and identity of the group is rooted in its dynamisms. The group, they argued, is 
a process, not a thing. And as a process, it could not be inferred, but instead had 
to be felt or intuited. The group is more than a multiple of interacting persons, 
even though it can be analyzed as such. The present concept of group entity 
builds upon this view by adding the notion that it is the quality oflife-likeness, in 
particular, that defines the group as an entity and distinguishes it from a group 
multiple. The vital animation of the Bosozoku gang and collective effervescence 
of a communal gathering differ fundamentally from the dreary mechanicalness 
of an assembly-line. The first are forms of life that define group entities, the last 
is a form of death that marks off alienated individuals. 
The idea that the group entity is a living form poses formidable difficulties. 
“The status oflife in Nature,” wrote Whitehead ( 1934, p. 53), “is the standing 
problem of philosophy and of science.” According to Whitehead, the very idea 
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of ‘a life’ implies an individuality which appropriates myriad physical processes 
into a functioning unity. Life, he argues, is not a physical thing, but a process. It 
is an ongoing act of immediate self-enjoyment or self-realization; an ‘occasion of 
experience’. A living form is a succession of these acts or occasions, extending 
from birth to the present in a single creative advance. However, conceiving of 
group entities in this way raises the problem of saying something definitive 
about them. What do you say after you have said that the group entity is a 
process? What is needed is a conceptual vocabulary that can be used to analyze 
these entities in useful ways. One such vocabulary has been suggested by Langer 
(1967),  and it is worth a word or two here to point out a way that group entities 
can be studied. 
According to Langer, the unity and vitality that distinguish living forms from 
non-living forms can be analyzed in terms of the special character of the 
elements of living forms and the dialectical patterning of those elements. 
Following Whitehead, Langer finds that the elements of living forms are not 
physical entities. They have not the character of things, but of acts or events. 
These elements are happenings within a continuous matrix of activity. As 
incorporeal acts, they are not literally objects, but have only a kind of virtual 
objectivity. While they can be recognized as distinct elements of an ongoing 
process, they fuse seamlessly into one another so that on close inspection it is 
impossible to say precisely where one act ends and another act begins. One act 
establishes the condition and grounds of another act which continues or 
completes the first. Every element of a life, says Langer, seems to emanate from 
the context in which it exists. Succeeding acts retain the character ofpreceeding 
acts, and the totality traces patterns of growth and development that are 
distinctive and definitive of living form. Langer further points out that the act 
elements which comprise living forms are interrelated in dialectical patterns. As 
act elements collide and interact they set up oppositions between and among 
themselves which define a dynamic system of tensions (tensive relations). These 
tensions and dynamisms among act elements are the empirical phenomena of 
living form; these tensions are known to observers as feelings. 
Generalizing from Langer’s concept of living form, we propose that group 
entities are living social forms which can be analyzed as act elements in tensive 
interplay. We propose further that group entities are known to observers by 
feelings that correspond to particular tensive patterns. Feeling is in the form of 
social life. Group entities are felt forms. Whatever the merits of this concept of 
group entity as living form, it is hoped that i t  will be permitted to stand as a kind 
of hypothesis until it can be adequately worked out. For now, it suffices to 
conceive of the group entity as a kind of vital form having the properties 
outlined above. 
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DISCUSSION 
We have tried to call attention to the group entity as a central element ofsocial 
life. Judging from our own difficulties in doing so, we are not surprised that it has 
received little formal study. One feels insecure in talking about feelings of a 
group; and only partly because feelings do not lend themselves to words 
(Sandelands, 1988). I t  is easier and more respectable to talk about a multiple of 
persons that can be seen and pointed out to others. 
That groups are almost exclusively regarded as multiples, rather than as 
entities, is perhaps because individuals are more compelling figures in 
perception than groups. Certainly, individuals are discerned more readily by 
the eye: they are distinct from other objects, and their parts are arranged 
invariantly and move together in a coordinated way. Individuals are well- 
suited also to detection by the other senses - their voices, odors, and textures 
are perceived e a ~ i l y . ~  In  contrast, group entities are invisible to the eye and 
unobvious to the other senses as well. Rather, as we have seen, they seem to be 
known by feelings that extend beyond sense impressions. 
This difference in sensory perceptibility is reinforced by cultural attunement 
to the individual. In the West especially, children learn early (often with 
immediate siblings) that a place in society is won in contest with other persons 
- which explains their fascination with others and fetish for comparisons. 
Viewed in this light, the group functions primarily as system for locating 
persons in a social order, thereby fixing their identity (Turner, 1985; Crocker & 
Luhtanen, 1990). This function is more pronounced the larger and more 
differentiated the society - to the point, eventually, that groups are little more 
than backdrops in the drama ofindividual destiny (recall Benedict’s example of 
the Plains Indians). 
Culture influences perception by validating particular ways of seeing as 
“fact”. Culture is the ground against which the figures of social perception are 
recognized. According to Warriner (1956, p. 552): 
This stress upon the individual, upon explanations in terms of psychology or 
psychological processes, and upon the lesser reality and importance of the group and 
other social phenomena have become the sensible, common-sense point of view. Its 
acceptance does not need to be defended because it is common-sense and because its 
doctrines are congenial to a period in which there is a general cultural stress upon 
individualism and the importance of the person. 
As long as common-sense holds that groups are multiples of individuals, then 
just so long will it interfere with awareness of group entities. The problem is 
compounded by the ease with which group multiples are defined. A multiple 
requires only a decision rule that includes certain individuals and excludes 
others. I t  could be persons who communicate face to face, or who are part of a 
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common division of labor, or who like one another, or who share a place and 
time - the possibilities are innumerable. In contrast, to see a group entity 
requires the faith to trust feelings that are hard to fathom or articulate. This sort 
of faith is rare, even among those who are committed to group entities. Writers 
such as Durkheim, Simmel, Kroeber, and Mayhew, affirm that groups are social 
facts, but they have been unsuccessful in studying them as such. When push 
comes to shove, when ontology turns to methodology, they concede that only 
individuals can be observed and can be a basis for empirical study. In this 
respect at least, Durkheim’s doctrine of methodological individualism betrays 
the insight that bore it. Justified by interest in social facts, it destroys them by 
reducing them to characteristics of individual persons. 
Still, somehow, there seems to be something to the group. Despite its tradition 
of overlooking group entities, and despite its many frustrations over the years, 
the study of groups continues to flourish and to enlist the interest of new 
generations of social scientists. And though its core problems persist, they 
remain interesting and alluring. Evidently, something gives researchers cause 
to continue. We suspect that this something is the unspoken sense that the group 
is an entity. Probably this sense is little more than an intimation - an  inchoate 
feeling that there is something there rather than nothing. For our part, we do  
not agree that the difficulties of coming to know group entities are reason to 
abandon them. To the contrary, we believe that these difficulties underscore the 
need to work harder to understand them and to find ways to talk about them. 
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New Questions for Study 
The  differences between group entities and group multiples suggest that there is 
a great deal about groups still to learn. In the wide differences between love and 
the multiple ofmarriage, or between communitas and a gathering in church, or 
between team play and variously motivated players, there is a gulf in 
understanding. Whereas the second of each pair is fairly well-understood, the 
first in each pair presents new questions for study. Little is known about the 
nature, ecology and natural history of group entities. Compare, for example, 
what is known about a simple multiple such as marriage with what is known 
about a simple entity such as a love relation. And, whereas it is relatively easy to 
observe and analyze marriages - e.g., to find out who gets married, how long 
marriages last, and under what conditions they dissolve - it is not easy to do the 
same with love relations (Martin & Luke, 199 I ) .  Who can say who falls in love, 
or how long love lasts, or what are its relevant parts? 
In addition to questions about the characteristics of group entities, there are 
questions also about the conditions under which they occur. I t  is not enough to 
ask ‘What are groups?’, we must ask also ‘When are groups?’. For example, 
when will a gathering in church achieve communitas? And, for how long? How 
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and why do certain multiples become entities? and certain entities become 
multiples? Are there discontinuities that mark the transition from one to 
another? Do these transitions correspond to phases, such as occur when a solid 
changes into a liquid? (see, e.g., Kroeber, 1917; on viewing cultures as 
superorganic entities). 
And then there are questions about the dynamics of group entities. What 
happens to these entities when members come and go? For example, are the 
Boston Celtics (a professional basketball team) the same team without Larry 
Bird (their retired star player)? Are they still a team? Or have they dissolved 
into a mere collection of players? There are dynamics as well pertaining to size 
and differentiation. What happens to group entities when they include a greater 
number of people? O r  when members become more differentiated? O r  when 
their internal structures change with the development of roles or sub-groups or 
sentiments? What happens to group entities when they come into contact with 
other group entities, or when they are required to share the same space? What 
happens when these entities compete, or cooperate, or merge? Although such 
questions are often asked ofgroups conceived as multiples, they are rarely asked 
of group entities. 
Although rare in social science, answers to questions such as these can 
sometimes be gleaned from journalistic accounts of groups. An example is 
Tracy Kidder’s ( I 98 I ) chronicle of a computer design team, the Eclipse Group, 
that worked for a well-known manufacturer of mini-computers. Although 
largely a tale of organizational politics and intrigue, it is a story also about a 
work group that occasionally transcended its members in its quest to build a 
new mini-computer called ‘Eagle’. In  this story one can see the effects on the 
group entity of arrivals and departures of personnel, of intrusions by outside 
groups and managers, and finally of the self-destructive effect of the group 
reflecting upon its own success. Writes Kidder (p. 288): 
Long before it disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in 
applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which 
engineers had contributed to Eagle’s patentable features. Some who attended found the 
meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. . . . 
Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did 
constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having 
a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team 
was losing its glue. “It has no function anymore. It’s like an afterbirth,” said one old 
hand after the last of the patent meetings. 
From the standpoint of this paper, we may ask further if the success of the 
‘Eagle’ development team was due to its operation as a group entity rather than 
as a group multiple. Such a conclusion, although at  this point clearly tentative, 
is not inconsistent with the observations that have led us to hypothesize the 
existence of group entities. In  fact, it is quite consistent with earlier examples 
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(e.g., the NCAA championship basketball team). Thus another question we 
can ask is whether (or when) group entities are more effective at task 
performance than group multiples. 
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Toward a More Comprehensive Study of Group3 
“To explain”, wrote Durkheim (1915 ,  p. 238), “is to show how one thing 
participates in one or several others”. Usually, explanations take one of a few 
basic forms. A thing may be compared to an analysis of parts; or it may be 
compared to an analogue or metaphor; or it may be compared to a general 
category ofthings to which it belongs. All of these explanations operate the same 
way; each compares one way of looking to another way of looking. 
For the study of groups, this suggests that once the existence of group entities 
is accepted as fact, then observed group entities must be compared to something 
else, such as multiples ofindividuals, or a system ofroles, or, as suggested above, 
a dialectically organized system of acts. Indeed, this is what usually happens in 
everyday discussions about groups: the common person refers to groups as 
entities (e.g., the family, church, IBM, the United States, the University), and 
then proceeds to make sense of the group in terms of the qualities and behaviors 
of the people who participate in them. For many social scientists, however, these 
types of discussions rarely get off the ground because of the failure to accept the 
reality of group entities. Social science lacks a genuine concept of group entity. 
Thus, the literature is cluttered with footnotes to explain that when we say “the 
organization made a decision” what we really mean is that “the top managers 
made a decision”. But if there really are no groups that amount to more than a 
multiple of individuals, then there is no reason to be concerned with anything 
other than individuals. Explanation must begin with the genuine article and 
then relate it to various analyses of parts. As Durkheim argued long ago, there 
can be no theory of groups unless there are group entities to theorize about. 
The identification of (at least some 09 the characteristics of group entities 
serves as a first step in developing methodologies for studying groups as entities 
rather than as multiples. Research toward this end must begin with the 
systematic identification and classification of groups as entities or multiples (or 
both). This process is facilitated by the characteristics that we have identified. 
Only when a sufficient sample ofgroup entities has been discerned can we begin 
to find answers to our questions of “when is a group entity” or test hypotheses 
about differences between group multiples and group entities. 
As one example, to test the hypothesis that task-oriented group entities 
perform more effectively than group multiples, observers could be asked to 
describe group interactions. Those descriptions could then be coded based on 
the five characteristics of group entities identified in this paper, and then the 
performance results of groups coded as entities could be compared against the 
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performance results of groups coded as multiples. One potential problem, of 
course, is that cultural blinders may make it difficult for observers to see and 
express differences between the two kinds of groups. Nevertheless, we believe 
that the five characteristics of group entities are overt enough and substantial 
enough to produce a reliable operationalization of the group entity concept. 
I t  remains then to compare group entities against conceptions of them as 
multiples. But this cannot happen until the elementary facts about group 
entities are discovered. When those facts are discovered, the need will arise to 
explain them, often perhaps in terms of facts about individual members. In  this 
way, theories of interpersonal behavior may be helpful for explaining certain 
facts about group entities - such as why some groups grow large while others 
remain small; why some groups live longer than others; or why two groups 
cannot occur in the same place at the same time. Conversely, there will also arise 
a need to explain facts about individuals in terms of facts about group entities. 
In  this view, questions may be asked about how group entities constrain or 
influence the people in them. 
This paper has provided diverse evidence for the existence of group entities. 
We have identified some of the fundamental characteristics of these entities and 
have advocated using these characteristics to begin identifying group entities 
for study. We have observed that the performance of group entities and group 
multiples appears to differ, suggesting some practical as well as theoretical 
implications for this research direction. We hope that this paper leads to a 
resurgence of interest in understanding group entities. Macro-micro linkages 
are becoming more important in research on social behavior. I t  seems only 
fitting that these linkages be considered at the level of the group, where both 
individuals within groups and groups in their own right play a vital role. 
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NOTES 
' This comparison of Indian cultures mirrors those drawn today between Western 
and Eastern Cultures. For example, it is said ofthe United States that its culture is a by- 
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product of the character of its citizenry (hence, the metaphor of the melting pot), 
whereas ofJapan it is said that its culture and national character transcend its individual 
citizens, who are subordinate and a by-product of its powerful influence. 
' There seems to be a generational quality to this worry. Every 10 years or so the 
problem ofconceiving groups is taken up again, but left without a final resolution (see, 
e.g., Kroeber, 1917; Allport, 1917; Benedict, 1934; White, 1947; Campbell, 1958; 
Warriner, 1956; Webster, 1973; Alexander, Geisen, Munch & Smelser, 1987; Allison & 
Messick, I 987). 
3 From time to time it is suggested that persons are not parts of groups. H. White 
(1gg2), for example, argues that the identities that constitute organizations are not 
necessarily persons, but rather may be any source of action that is not explicable from 
biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning. And writing for 
a previous generation, L. White (1947) argued that group life is defined by its culture, 
which is a continuum of interacting elements which are not persons, but rather 
sentiments, ideas, and images: 
Thus, paradoxical though it may seem, the proper study of mankind turns out to be not 
Man, but Culture. The most realistic and scientifically adequate interpretation of 
culture is one that proceeds as ifhuman beings did not exist. 
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See von Frisch (1962) for a like-minded account ofsocial groupings among animals, 
Campbell (1972) and others speak of this as a central element of mythology: 
and particularly of insects such as ants, termites, and bees. 
This recognition of mortality and the requirement to transcend it is the first great 
impulse to mythology. And along with this there runs another realization; namely, that 
the social group into which the individual has been born, which nourishes and protects 
him and which, for the greater part of his life, he must himself help to nourish and 
protect, was flourishing long before his own birth and will remain when he is gone. That 
is to say, not only does the individual member ofour species, conscious ofhimself as such, 
face death, but he confronts also the necessity to adapt himself to whatever order of life 
may happen to be that of the community into which he has been born, this being an 
order of life superordinated to his own, a superorganism into which he must allow 
himself to be absorbed, and through participation in which he will come to know the life 
that transcends death. [pp. 2-2 I ]  
' Although speculative, it seems that feeling of the group would be based on two kinds 
of experiences. One is experience of the internal functioning of the group; of those 
activities that constitute its organism. The other is experience ofimpact from outside, as 
a function of the group's relation to its environment. Although these two experiences 
may be felt differently by different members of a group (perhaps systematically in 
relation to their vantage point), both may be necessary for a coherent experience of the 
group entity. 
Although Levy-Bruhl proposed initially that this mode of perception was definitive 
of primitive mentality and set it apart from civilized mentality, in later writings he 
retreated from this bold assessment to suggest that this way of seeing was more 
prominent in the former than in the latter, but present in some degree in both (see, 
Littleton, 1985). 
Writing in a different vein, and of his own modern and mature ego, James (1902) 
draws a parallel distinction between mundane awareness of things and categories, and a 
special, seemingly earlier feeling of greater entities and powers. According to James, 
whereas some things are known by intellectual discernment, others are felt as presences 
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at the margins of consciousness. Thus, in a confession of his own philosophizing, he 
writes: 
The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present 
consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those 
other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that 
although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two 
become continuous at certain points and higher energies filter in. (p. 509) 
It is important to distinguish the biological concept of the individual from the 
sociological concept ofthe person. The former is a physical fact that is given immediately 
to perception, the latter is an abstraction ofa high order (see, Berger & Luckmann, 1966; 
p. 50) and as such not given immediately to perception. To see a person is to see an 
individual in the broader sociological context of society (see also, Moscovici, 1989). 
Thus, although we use the two terms interchangeably in this paper, the points about 
perception pertain most directly to the biological individual. 
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